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The Composition and Allocation 
of Global Financial Flows
What Are Markets Doing?
Linda Tesar
University of Michigan
This chapter focuses on global fi nancial fl ows and how they have 
changed in response to the series of fi nancial crises that swept through 
emerging markets in the mid- to late 1990s. There have been some sig-
nifi cant changes in the direction and the composition of capital fl ow, 
and this chapter argues that some of those changes can be understood 
as the response of markets to fundamental weaknesses in the global 
fi nancial system—weaknesses that have not been adequately addressed 
by multilateral institutions or by individual governments.
Development is fundamentally about moving resources to the 
places where they are needed most. Somehow the movement of those 
resources needs to be fi nanced, whether as outright transfers, through 
loans, through direct investment in foreign corporations, or through 
securities markets. The nature of development fi nance has changed dra-
matically over time, and we have learned, sometimes through painful 
experience, about how the composition of capital fl ow from rich to poor 
countries matters. While the composition of capital fl ow is by defi nition 
a “macro” phenomenon, I suggest that micro evidence on the way fi rms 
structure their lending to emerging markets contains important clues 
about the vulnerabilities of the global fi nancial environment, and how 
fi rms have responded to those weaknesses. 
The fi nancial crises that swept through East Asia and Latin America 
in the mid- to late 1990s interrupted global fl ows, but one feature that 
stands out is the resilience of, and even the expansion of, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) fl ows. One can think of the policy reforms applied to 
emerging markets in two phases: fi rst as the “Washington Consensus 
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I,” which emphasized getting prices right (the Washington Consensus 
is explained further in the following section). We learned from fi nancial 
crises that getting prices right is not enough, and there is a new per-
spective that I have labeled “Washington Consensus II,” which is about 
getting institutions right. The world made progress with phase I, the 
opening of markets, but has been less successful with phase II. Failure 
to adequately address institutions has not stopped capital fl ow, but it has 
changed the nature of that fl ow. 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL FLOWS AND THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
Historically, fl ows to developing countries moved through offi -
cial channels—from multilateral agencies or governments to recipient 
governments. Bank lending and FDI played a role, but offi cial fl ows 
accounted for the majority of capital fl ow to developing countries. In 
the 1990s, the composition of capital fl ow began to shift away from 
offi cial assistance toward private capital fl ow. Much of this shift was 
due to the dramatic changes in policy that occurred under the “Wash-
ington Consensus,” a term coined by John Williamson (2002) at the 
Institute for International Economics. It was a convenient label for the 
broad set of policies supported by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF for 
reforming economies in emerging markets. 
The Washington Consensus covered three broad areas, the fi rst of 
which was that developing countries should have greater macroeco-
nomic discipline, including a reduction in fi scal defi cits, reprioritization 
of expenditures, and tax reform. The second major component was to 
encourage policies that foster the market economy to liberalize interest 
rates, liberalize the banking system, deregulate fi nancial institutions, 
privatize government-run enterprises, and encourage greater securitiza-
tion. In other words, the reforms were intended to create a greater role 
for market-determined prices to affect allocations. One of the key prices 
in small open economies is the exchange rate, although the debate still 
ensues today about the best way to manage exchange rates.
Finally, the consensus supported opening the economy to the global 
marketplace through trade liberalization and, to some extent, capital 
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account liberalization. Ex post, there is now a heated debate about 
whether capital account liberalization is a good idea and if so, how it 
should best be accomplished, but ex ante, many economists believed 
that emerging market economies would benefi t from lifting restrictions 
on the extent of foreign control, allowing foreigners to become share-
holders in local fi rms and encouraging the entry of foreign banks. In 
response to pressure from the IMF and other institutions, many coun-
tries undertook massive privatization programs and liberalized their 
capital markets. These privatization programs took place in conjunction 
with the removal of capital account restrictions that permitted increased 
market access to foreign investors. 
Economists predicted that such reforms would generate a number 
of benefi ts for emerging markets. Economic theory suggests that open-
ing to global fi nancial markets should stimulate the fl ow of capital from 
capital-rich to capital-poor countries and reduce the cost of capital in 
markets where it is scarce. The reforms should increase the effi ciency of 
the fi nancial sector and facilitate the transfer of technology. A second-
order effect is to help diversify risk by reducing local investors’ expo-
sure to country-specifi c risk. At a minimum, these reforms, even if they 
do not change the long-run growth rate, would speed the transition to 
the country’s long-run steady state by an infl ow of foreign capital. The 
more optimistic view is that fi nancial liberalization and openness could 
potentially increase economic growth rates. 
Many countries took this policy advice and opened their markets. 
The number of countries with stock markets open to foreign investors 
increased from 14 in 1980 (essentially the largest OECD countries) to 
35 in 1992, leveling off to 41 in the late 1990s (Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad 2005). Chinn and Ito (2006) develop an alternative measure 
of openness, taking into account policy differences across countries in 
the various components of the capital account (see Figure 5.1). Their 
measure captures the opening of the capital accounts, particularly in 
Latin America and East Europe.1
Net resource fl ows to developing countries, and most notably fl ows 
to emerging markets, increased dramatically from the early 1980s to 
the mid-1990s (see Figure 5.2). If we strategically stop time in 1997, it 
appears that capital fl ow responded as economists predicted it would: 
with a quadrupling of total fl ow from $75 billion in 1990 to over $300 
billion in 1997. Looking at fl ows by type, FDI followed a similar path, 
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increasing from less than $50 billion to more than $150 billion over the 
same period. International investment in portfolio equity, which was 
virtually nonexistent in the 1980s, accounted for an increasing share 
of capital fl ow in the early 1990s. At its peak in 1993, equity fl ows 
accounted for 20 percent of total capital infl ow in developing countries.
Privatization and increased foreign investment led to a boom in 
emerging stock markets. The growth in stock market capitalization of 
emerging markets, which refl ects the increase in the number of fi rms 
listed on the market as well as the change in stock prices, was a stag-
gering 250 percent over the 1990–1996 period. The U.S. equity market, 
enjoying its own stock market boom over this period, grew about 170 
percent, with slower rates of growth in the United Kingdom and Japan. 
Foreign markets, particularly emerging markets, looked like a good 






























Figure 5.1  Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index
SOURCE: Chinn and Ito (2006).
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fraction of U.S. equities in the U.S. portfolio, declined from 97 percent 
in the 1980s to about 88 percent in 1995.
Despite the increased fl ows to developing markets, international 
capital markets were still dominated by fl ows between industrialized 
countries. Of the total global outfl ow of FDI of $322 billion in 1995, 94 
percent, or $302 billion, was invested in industrialized countries. Simi-
larly, 96 percent of outward investment in portfolio equity was invested 
in industrialized countries. So, while there was some seepage of global 
fl ows into developing countries, the volume of that fl ow remained rela-
tively small.
Capital markets also did not deliver on the promise of redistribut-
ing wealth from the rich to the poor. A Lorenz curve of the distribution 
of wealth for 59 countries, which shows the fraction of global wealth 
accounted for by each decile of countries ranked by wealth, shows very 
little change between 1970 and 1995 (Figure 5.3). Wealth here includes 
Figure 5.2  Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 1980–2005
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the capitalized value of a country’s capital stock as well as its stock 
of foreign assets. If wealth were distributed approximately evenly, 
the poorest 10 percent of countries would have 10 percent of global 
wealth. (If the distribution were exactly equal, the Lorenz curve would 
lie along the 45 degree line and there would be no distinction between 
the rich and the poor.) The data suggest that 10 percent of global wealth 
is shared by the bottom 50 percent of countries. These fi gures are an 
underestimate of the uneven distribution of wealth, because the sample 
excludes most of sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest countries in Asia, and 
Eastern Europe because of the lack of information on capital stocks and 
net foreign assets in those regions.
Even if one thought that wealth might not be affected by the open-
ing of capital markets, one would hope that the allocation of capital 
would be affected. That is, open capital markets would encourage 
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on net foreign asset and liability data reported 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
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investment in capital-scarce countries even if ownership of that capital, 
and therefore wealth, remained in the hands of investors in industrial-
ized countries. Unfortunately, the data suggest that there was also very 
little change in the distribution of capital across countries between 1970 
and 1995. In 1995, the richest 50 percent of countries accounted for 85 
percent of the global capital stock.
Of course, the clock did not stop in the mid-1990s, and beginning 
with the Mexican crisis in December 1994, global markets were buf-
feted with a series of fi nancial shocks that seemed to spread from one 
market to the next. These crises resulted in (or some would say were 
caused by) a sudden reversal of capital fl ow from emerging markets, 
speculative attacks on fi xed exchange rates and the central banks that 
supported them, collapses in the fi nancial sectors of many Latin Ameri-
can and Southeast Asian countries, liquidity crises, and ultimately 
widespread defaults. The cause of these crises remains a topic of heated 
discussion and is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The “sudden stop” in capital fl ow to emerging markets resulted in a 
dramatic reduction in total fl ows to developing countries, from a peak 
of $310 billion in 1997 to less than $200 billion in 2001. Flows of long-
term debt fell in 1999 and became negative in 2001. Portfolio equity 
fl ows were reduced to a trickle. Interestingly, while the other types of 
fl ow declined, FDI remained steady from 1997 on and took a sharp 
turn upward in 2003. This is seen even more clearly when one looks 
at the decomposition of fl ows by type (i.e., as a percentage of total 
fl ow). Throughout the entire 1980–2001 period, FDI as a fraction of 
total infl ow steadily increased, and by 2001 it accounted for 80 percent 
of the total volume of fl ow to developing countries. The remainder of 
the chapter examines why, and how one should think about FDI fl ows 
in this environment.
To understand FDI fl ows, it helps to make the distinction between 
greenfi eld investments, the infl ow of new investments, and “brown-
fi eld” investments, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that refl ect the 
purchase of existing plants and equipment. Throughout the late 1990s 
the fraction of FDI that is accounted for by the acquisition of fi rms 
in emerging markets by fi rms in industrialized countries increased. In 
1999, over 90 percent of FDI in Asia was due to cross-border M&As. 
The rise in cross-border M&As as a form of external fi nance was 
in part due to changes in the regulations affecting foreign ownership. 
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In many countries in East Asia, foreign investors were explicitly pro-
hibited from gaining a controlling share in local fi rms. For example, in 
1996 the ceiling on the amount of stock foreigners could acquire in all 
Korean companies without the approval of the board of directors was 
only 18 percent. Another feature of the market for corporate control in 
Korea was that cross-holdings across business groups (Chaebols) were 
substantial. This situation changed dramatically as a consequence of 
the fi nancial crises that swept the region during 1997. The IMF bailout 
packages to Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia included explicit provi-
sions for restructuring domestic capital markets and to allow foreign 
competition in the market for corporate control. 
Another feature of FDI infl ows is that they are lumpy; that is, a 
single transaction in a small market can have a huge impact on aggre-
gate fl ow. Argentina is an interesting example. In 1999, forecasts about 
Argentina’s near economic future and the viability of its currency board 
were grim. Debt fl ows steeply declined and portfolio infl ows turned 
negative. Foreign direct investment, however, surged upward to unprec-
edented levels. A careful look at the data reveals that the sale of YPF, 
an oil and gas company, to Repsol, a Spanish enterprise, accounted for 
63 percent of total FDI infl ow in that year. Had Repsol not made the 
purchase, net fl ows to Argentina would have been close to zero.
The next question is how to interpret the boom in foreign acquisi-
tions in emerging markets. Many views in the press range from fi rms 
now having access to the “exciting opportunities” in emerging markets, 
to a fi re sale of assets resulting from the liquidity crises, to the fear of 
“recolonization” by foreign entities (the latter is attributed to Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister Mahathir). Economists also express a range of opinions, 
from FDI as the “good cholesterol” (borrowing may not be good for 
you, but if you have to do it FDI is the least dangerous form) to a more 
neutral perspective (FDI is simply the transfer of assets from domestic 
to foreign hands and therefore may have little real economic impact) to 
a more positive view that FDI enables the transfer of technology and 
creates synergies between parents and their affi liates.
To try to shed light on the factors that drive cross-border M&As, I 
explore three questions. First, is there value creation from the transfer 
of assets from domestic to foreign hands? Second, if there is value cre-
ation, who captures the gains—targets in emerging markets or acquir-
ers from industrialized countries? And fi nally, are there special circum-
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stances under which gains exist, and why? To get at these questions, 
I will use the stock price reaction of acquirer and target fi rms to the 
announcement of an M&A transaction as a summary statistic for the 
value created through cross-border M&A activity. 
The results in this chapter are drawn from Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 
(2009). The returns are cumulated average abnormal returns over a 
three-day event window around the announcement date.2 Our data set 
includes all acquisitions of fi rms in 42 emerging markets in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America by fi rms from nine industrialized countries. The sam-
ple period covers 1986–2006, making it possible to test for the effects 
of fi nancial crisis on the gains from an acquisition. The data set includes 
various fi rm, industry, and transactions characteristics. We also have 
data for a control group that includes domestic and other industrialized-
country acquisitions by U.S. and European fi rms. This allows us to com-
pare the gains from acquiring a target in an emerging market relative to 
the gains from acquiring a target in another industrialized country.
Our analysis yields three main fi ndings. First, there is value cre-
ation from cross-border M&As in emerging markets. Between 1986 
and 2006, developed market acquirers experienced positive and sig-
nifi cant abnormal returns of 1.16 percent, on average, over a three-day 
event window. 
Our second fi nding is that shareholders of acquiring fi rms reap the 
lion’s share of the gains, and this gain is associated with acquiring con-
trol. The median acquirer records cumulative abnormal returns of 0.72 
percent in transactions where control is acquired, while the median 
cumulative abnormal return for acquirers in transactions where control 
is not acquired is 0.02 percent. Over the period we study, the cumu-
lated dollar value gain from cross-border acquisitions in emerging mar-
kets where control was acquired was $10.5 billion for developed mar-
ket shareholders. Note that this is in stark contrast to the results from 
the domestic M&A literature where studies fi nd that M&As are value 
destroying and that the gains, if any, accrue to the target’s shareholders 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2005). This suggests that something 
very different is going on in the emerging market context. The effect 
appears to be closely related to corporate control. 
Finally, we fi nd that the gains for acquirers are largest in R&D 
intensive sectors, conditional on gaining control. To obtain this result, 
we fi rst estimate R&D intensity at the industry level based on a cross-
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section of U.S. industries. We then use those estimates as a measure of 
R&D intensity of targets (by industry). When we include this measure 
of R&D intensity as a control variable in the regression, we fi nd that 
corporate control, crossed with R&D intensity, is a signifi cant explana-
tor of acquirer gains. One interpretation of this fi nding is that there are 
productive synergies from M&As that involve the transfer of technol-
ogy, but these synergies are only realized (and the technology is trans-
ferred) when the acquirer obtains control.
How can we interpret these fi ndings? In Financial Crisis, Liquid-
ity and the International Monetary Problem, Jean Tirole (2001) offers 
insight into the potential causes of market failure in emerging markets 
that has direct bearing on the decision to acquire a foreign fi rm. First, 
he assumes that there are many lenders, and that lenders do not coor-
dinate their actions. On the borrowing side, he assumes that the local 
government can take actions that affect the payoffs of the fi rm, and that 
the incentives of the government are not fully aligned with those of the 
fi rm. Two problems then arise. First, the lack of coordination among 
lenders means that each lender is uncertain about the borrowing coun-
try’s overall level of indebtedness, and each lender is uncertain about 
the relative seniority of his or her own claim. This situation can lead to 
sunspot equilibria, speculative attacks, and contagion as each investor 
tries to infer from inexact signals whether or not his or her claim will be 
honored. The second problem is that lenders would like to contract with 
the fi rm, but the government is an implicit partner in the arrangement. 
Thus, the lender is exposed to expropriation risk; that is, actions that are 
not in the best interest of the fi rm.
Foreign direct investment, in the form of acquiring control of the 
emerging market fi rm, offers a way out of these two problems. By con-
tracting explicitly with the shareholders of the target fi rm, FDI essen-
tially cuts out other lenders (minimizing the multiple lender problem). 
In gaining majority ownership of the fi rm, shareholders of the acquir-
ing fi rm are able to extend the boundary of the fi rm into the emerging 
market, effectively replacing the government of the target-fi rm nation 
with that of the acquirer. This is not to say that all expropriation risk 
is eliminated—the target’s government could still violate international 
law, for example, and nationalize the target. But by consolidating the 
balance sheets of the target and the acquirer, the acquisition effectively 
extends the reach of the acquirer’s home institutions into the borrower’s 
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market. In a sense, the target imports the corporate and legal institutions 
from the acquirer.
Foreign direct investment is not, however, a panacea for the weak 
institutions problem plaguing emerging markets. It is relatively immo-
bile, may be infl exible, and may not help a country diversify its risk. 
It also comes at a price. In order to attract FDI and to compensate for 
the weak institutions problem, target shareholders in emerging markets 
give up both control and, relative to target shareholders in industrial 
countries, returns. The only complete solution is for governments in 
emerging markets to address the weaknesses in their contracting envi-
ronment, to offer greater property rights protection, and to make fi rms 
less vulnerable to capricious changes in government policy. 
Another recent phenomenon, which I believe is also a symptom of 
the weak institutions problem, is the dramatic rise in foreign reserve 
accumulation in developing countries. According to neoclassical theory, 
capital-scarce countries should be net borrowers, not net lenders. Yet 
what we see is the accumulation of large holdings of dollar reserves by 
foreign governments, particularly in developing countries. Economists 
continue to debate about the explanation of these reserve holdings, but 
one plausible explanation is that in a world where fi nancial meltdowns 
are a possibility, foreign reserves serve as collateral and provide a sig-
nal to foreign investors that the countries’ balance sheets are sound. 
SUMMARY 
The composition of global fi nancial fl ows to emerging markets 
changed dramatically in the postfi nancial crisis period. External fi nance 
is now much more likely to take the form of the sale of domestic assets, 
with control rights shifting to the acquiring fi rm. In my view, this 
change in the composition of fl ows is a natural response to institutional 
weaknesses in emerging markets. Control of foreign subsidiaries allows 
for both capital fl ow and for the protection of property rights of the 
acquiring fi rm, but it is not a perfect substitute for strong institutions 
that would extend to all fi rms in emerging markets. 
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Notes
 1.  For more details on their index, see Chinn and Ito (2006).
 2.  Our working paper includes robustness checks for different windows around the 
announcement date.
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